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Off-Site Conditions and Disclosure Duties:
Drawing the Line at the Property Line
Florrie Young Roberts∗
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Duty To Disclose Defects
In a majority of jurisdictions, a seller of real property has an
affirmative obligation to make certain disclosures to the buyer
concerning the condition of the property being sold.1 This is a
reversal of the old rule of caveat emptor, “let the buyer beware,” that
governed sales of real property until the middle of the twentieth
century.2 Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, as long as the seller
did not affirmatively misrepresent the condition of the property or
conceal a defect, he could without liability remain silent and fail to
disclose the existence of defects to the buyer.3
The doctrine of caveat emptor was abandoned for reasons of
fairness and efficiency. As one court noted, modern notions of good
faith and fair dealing are inconsistent with a seller escaping liability
for the existence of a latent defect of which he knows and declines to
disclose to a diligent buyer.4 Accordingly, most states now impose a
duty on sellers to disclose certain defects to buyers. Generally, a
defect must be disclosed if it is known to the seller, not observable to
∗ Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California; B.A. 1971, Stanford
University; J.D. 1974, University of Southern California. The author wishes to thank her
research assistants, Lior Kosovski and Carrie Frederickson, for their valuable contributions to
this Article.
1. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985); Thacker v. Tyree, 297
S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982).
2. Leo Bearman Jr., Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty—Recent Assaults upon the Rule,
14 VAND. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (1961).
3. See Haskell Co. v. Lane Co., 612 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“The
doctrine of caveat emptor . . . provides that . . . [a]bsent an express agreement, a material
misrepresentation or active concealment of a material fact, the seller cannot be held liable for
any harm sustained by the buyer or others as the result of a defect existing at the time of the
sale.”).
4. Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 628.
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the prospective buyer, and materially affects the value of the
property.5
B. The Problem of Off-Site Conditions
An unresolved issue regarding the scope of the seller’s obligation
to disclose conditions affecting the property concerns the location of
the alleged defect. The initial cases overturning caveat emptor, and
by far the majority of cases imposing a disclosure duty, have involved
defects located within the boundaries of the property being sold.
Such defects are referred to as “on-site conditions” and include, for
example, a leaky roof,6 a cracked foundation,7 cockroach infestation,8 defective sewage disposal,9 and asbestos on the property.10
However, some disappointed buyers have sued sellers for failure
to disclose defects when the alleged defect was external to the
property itself. Such defects are called “off-site conditions.”
Examples of off-site conditions include noisy neighbors,11 a nearby
highway,12 an adjacent wastewater treatment plant,13 construction of
an apartment complex in the area,14 a neighbor’s plans to build a
tennis court,15 and a toxic waste contamination problem on a
neighboring property.16

5. E.g., Shapiro v. Sutherland, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 107 (Ct. App. 1998). For a
discussion of the general duty to disclose defects, see Florrie Young Roberts, Disclosure Duties
in Real Estate Sales and Attempts To Reallocate the Risk, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001).
6. Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 626.
7. Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885, 886 (W. Va. 1982).
8. Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 71 (N.J. 1974).
9. Anderson v. Harper, 622 A.2d 319, 324–25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
10. Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 805, 809 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
11. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Sutherland, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 105 (Ct. App. 1998).
12. See, e.g., DiNunzio v. Jenkins, No. 97-0706B, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 300, at
*2–3 (July 21, 1999).
13. Ribak v. Centex Real Estate Corp., 702 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
14. Blaine v. J.E. Jones Constr. Co., 841 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
15. Tobin v. Paparone Constr. Co., 349 A.2d 574, 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1975).
16. Urman v. S. Boston Sav. Bank, 674 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Mass. 1997).
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C. Summary of Article

Courts use various approaches when the alleged defect is an offsite condition. Part II outlines these differing methods. Some
jurisdictions use the same test as they would if the defect were on the
property itself.17 Other jurisdictions have formulated specific rules
applicable to off-site conditions.18 Similarly, jurisdictions have
adopted different legislative approaches to off-site conditions which
are explored in Part III. Some statutes require disclosure of certain
off-site conditions,19 while others appear to limit the disclosure duty
to on-site defects.20 Part IV briefly mentions the treatment of two
problematic off-site conditions—stigma defects and the presence of a
sex offender in the neighborhood. After exploring the various
judicial and statutory approaches, Part V argues that nonprofessional sellers21 of real estate should have no duty to disclose
off-site conditions. Such a bright-line rule of no disclosure would
provide predictability and promote judicial efficiency without
compromising fairness.22
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. Some of the cases and statutes discussed in this article apply to brokers, developers,
or professional sellers. These cases are mentioned to illustrate the various approaches that
courts and legislatures have used. The policies and the proposed rule discussed in Part V of this
Article are meant to apply specifically to non-professional sellers of real property. This article
does not consider whether additional duties should be placed on brokers or professional sellers.
22. The rule proposed by this Article applies to a seller’s failure to disclose defects and
does not address the situation where a seller makes an affirmative misrepresentation. Just as the
doctrine of caveat emptor did not protect a seller who made affirmative misrepresentations
about on-site defects, Westover Court Corp. v. Eley, 40 S.E.2d 177, 179 (Va. 1946) (holding
that a buyer is entitled to recover damages due to a seller’s misrepresentations), a bright-line
rule of non-disclosure with regard to off-site defects should not protect a seller who
misrepresents information to a buyer or falsely responds to a buyer’s questions.
For example, in O’Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., the seller was aware that two
buyers intended to use the purchased land for chemical storage and represented to the buyers
that the land would be suitable for such a purpose. 542 A.2d 333, 334–35 (Conn. App. Ct.
1988). After closing, the city refused to allow the buyer to build because the well of a nearby
town could have been polluted as a result. Id. at 335. The court concluded that a jury could
reasonably find that the seller’s misrepresentation induced the buyers to purchase the land. Id.
at 337. Similarly, in M/I Schottenstein Homes, Inc. v. Azam, the plaintiff claimed that the seller
represented to him that a parcel of land located approximately five hundred feet away was a
natural preserve. 813 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 2002). After closing, the buyer discovered that the
county planned to build a school on that parcel. Id. The court concluded that the questions of
whether a seller made fraudulent misrepresentations and whether a buyer was justified in
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II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DISCLOSURE OF OFF-SITE
CONDITIONS
A. Off-Site Defects Treated the Same as On-Site Defects
A number of courts have utilized an approach that makes no
distinction between disclosure duties for on-site and off-site
conditions. The same test is used for a seller’s duty to disclose
defects, irrespective of the physical location of that defect.
1. Parameters of the common law disclosure duty
Most states that impose a common law duty on sellers to disclose
defects look to similar factors to determine what defects must be
disclosed. Disclosure is required for defects that are (1) known to the
seller, (2) unknown and not readily observable by the buyer, and (3)
material.23 A defect is material if it objectively affects the value or
desirability of the property.24 For purposes of this Article, this test
will be referred to as the “general disclosure duty” test or the
“general” test.
The cases in which this general test originated involved major
physical defects in the property being sold. For example, in Clauser
v. Taylor, an early California case imposing a duty on the seller to
disclose defects, the seller failed to disclose that the property had
been filled with debris and then covered over.25 Similarly, in Johnson
v. Davis, the first case imposing a duty to disclose defects in Florida
and calling the doctrine of caveat emptor “unappetizing,”26 the seller
had failed to disclose a badly leaking roof.27

relying on such misrepresentations are questions of fact to be determined on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 94. Accordingly, the court affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of a motion to
dismiss that was previously granted in favor of the sellers. Id. at 96.
Similarly, beyond the scope of this Article is a discussion of the law in those states
that still adhere to the doctrine of caveat emptor in real estate sales. For a discussion of the law
in these jurisdictions, see Roberts, supra note 5, at 13–14. Since these jurisdictions do not even
require disclosure of on-site conditions, they would not require disclosure of off-site
conditions.
23. E.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985).
24. Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (Ct. App. 1963).
25. 112 P.2d 661, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
26. Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 628.
27. Id. at 626. Following a heavy rain, the plaintiff homeowners discovered water
“‘gushing’ in from around the window frame, the ceiling of the family room, the light fixtures,
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2. Cases where courts used the general test and required disclosure of
off-site conditions
Some courts have applied the traditional analysis for the duty to
disclose on-site conditions to determine whether sellers also have a
duty to disclose off-site conditions. In Ribak v. Centex Real Estate
Corp., residential homebuyers brought suit against a developer/seller
alleging that the seller had failed to disclose the existence of a
wastewater treatment plant adjacent to the purchased property.28
The trial court granted partial summary judgment stating that
Florida law did not impose on a seller an obligation to disclose offsite conditions.29 The appellate court disagreed and reiterated the
general disclosure duty test that disclosure is required where the
seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the
property that are not readily observable and not known to the
buyer.30 Thus, the Ribak court espoused the same test for the
disclosure of off-site conditions as it uses for on-site conditions. It
made no distinction based on the location of the condition and held
the seller liable for nondisclosure.
California also takes this approach of treating on-site and off-site
conditions similarly. California’s common law imposes the broad
disclosure duty under the general test31 that requires sellers to
disclose to a buyer all material defects in the residential property
actually known to the seller but unknown and unobservable to the
buyer. While many cases have dealt with physical defects in the
property being sold, only one California case has considered the
the glass doors, and the stove in the kitchen.” Id.
28. 702 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). Twenty-two residential homebuyers sued the developer/seller for conspiracy, fraud, negligent supervision, negligent misrepresentation, breach of duty to disclose material facts, and violation of the Florida Land Sales
Practices Act. Id.
29. Id. The trial court held that Johnson v. Davis did not impose a duty to disclose
conditions that are off-site or open and obvious. Id. The trial court also specifically declined to
follow Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995), because that case “involved an extreme
set of facts involving a toxic landfill” and because Strawn was inconsistent with Florida law.
Ribak, 702 So. 2d at 1317.
30. Ribak, 702 So. 2d at 1317 (citing Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 629). According to the
Ribak court, a seller’s liability under Johnson is measured against whether the seller possessed
knowledge of material facts affecting the value of the property that were not disclosed to an
“unsuspecting buyer.” Id. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting
summary judgment to the developer/seller because the issue of materiality is one for the jury.
Id.
31. See Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1963).
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common law duty to disclose an off-site condition. In Shapiro v.
Sutherland, the court examined the off-site condition of
neighborhood noise and applied both the common law and a
statutory disclosure duty.32 The court utilized the same general test
for this off-site condition as is used for on-site conditions and held
that a seller should disclose a neighborhood noise problem if the
noise “materially affects the value or desirability of the property.”33
In other words, the court held that a seller is required to disclose an
off-site condition if the elements of the general test are met.34
Although not a suit by a buyer against a seller for failure to
disclose an off-site condition, another California case stated that a
seller would be required to disclose on the statutory disclosure form
a neighbor’s noisy activity. In Alexander v. McKnight, the plaintiffs
filed an action seeking equitable relief and damages due to their
neighbors’ disagreeable behavior and violation of private
restrictions.35 The disagreeable behavior included the use of a noisy
tree chipper for a tree trimming business the neighbors operated out
of their home, late-night basketball games, too many cars parked on
their property, and motor oil poured on their roof.36 The plaintiff
claimed that if and when he sold the property, he would need to
disclose the noise problems, which would diminish the purchase
price for his property.37 The court agreed, holding that if the
conduct amounted to a nuisance and had a negative impact on the
value of the property, the conduct would need to be disclosed by the
plaintiff under California’s disclosure statute upon sale of the
house.38
32. 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Ct. App. 1998); see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102–1102.17 (West
2005). California’s disclosure form mandated by statute enumerates mostly on-site conditions,
but also requires disclosure of neighborhood noise problems or “other nuisances.” Id. §
1102.6. See infra text accompanying notes 129–43.
33. Shapiro, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 107.
34. The court specifically stated that sellers had a common law and statutory obligation
to make a full disclosure as to these disturbances caused by the neighbors “if they in fact
occurred and were of sufficient import as to materially affect the value or desirability of their
property and/or amounted to a ‘neighborhood noise problem’ or a ‘nuisance’” Id. at 108.
35. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1992).
36. Id.
37. Id. The trial court in a bench trial awarded plaintiffs injunctive relief and damages of
$28,000. Id. at 454. The defendants appealed only $24,000 of the monetary award. Id.
38. Id. at 454–55. However, the appellate court denied awarding “diminution in
property value” damages in addition to injunctive relief as it would constitute unjust
enrichment on the plaintiff’s part. Id. at 456. Assuming that the neighbors would obey the
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Similarly, New Jersey’s common law disclosure duty did not
initially depend on whether the defects were on- or off-site. In Tobin
v. Paparone Construction Co., the builder/seller was found liable for
failing to disclose an adjacent neighbor’s plans to build a tennis court
and a high fence that would obstruct the buyer’s view.39 The court
held that the builder/seller had a duty to disclose these plans since
the buyer could not have discovered them.40 The court cited judicial
trends in other jurisdictions to justify requiring higher accountability
from builder/sellers based on the disparity of experience and the
superior access a builder/seller has to information.41 The location of
the defect did not appear to be a relevant factor in the court’s
analysis.
Twenty years later in Strawn v. Canuso, the New Jersey Supreme
Court specifically considered whether sellers had a disclosure duty
with respect to off-site conditions.42 In Strawn, the buyers of homes
sued the developer and marketing brokers for failing to disclose the
existence of a nearby hazardous waste dump.43 The trial court had
rejected the need to disclose an off-site condition stating that “there
is no duty that the owner of lands owe[s] to a prospective purchaser
to disclose to that prospective purchaser the conditions of somebody
else’s property.”44 The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed and
held that a builder/developer of residential real estate or a broker
can be liable for failing to disclose off-site physical defects. Liability
attaches for failure to disclose those off-site physical conditions
known to the developer or broker and “unknown and not readily
observable by the buyer if the existence of those conditions is of
sufficient materiality to affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment of
the property and, therefore, render the property substantially less
desirable or valuable to the objectively reasonable buyer.”45 This is

injunction to cease the noisy activity, the plaintiff would not suffer a decrease in property value
when he eventually sold his house. Id. at 457.
39. 349 A.2d 574, 580 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). The tennis court came within
one foot of plaintiff’s property line and was surrounded by a ten-foot high chain link fence. Id.
at 575–76.
40. Id. at 577.
41. Id. at 578 (citing Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965)).
42. 657 A.2d 420, 423 (N.J. 1995).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 424.
45. Id. at 431.
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the same test for disclosure of defects generally, so the court made
no distinction between on-site and off-site conditions.
The decision in Strawn was limited to professional
builder/developers of real estate or brokers representing such
projects and did not pertain to non-professional sellers of residential
or commercial property.46 The court imposed the duty on
professional sellers, developers, and brokers because of their superior
bargaining power and their access to information, as well as the
recent trends in other jurisdictions requiring a broker to investigate
the property for material defects.47 The court exempted nonprofessional sellers from this duty because such sellers are on equal
footing with buyers.48
Only five months after the decision in Strawn, the New Jersey
legislature showed its disapproval of the case by passing a statute
limiting the disclosure duty.49 Under the statute, a professional seller
need only provide written notice to buyers of the existence of a list
of certain off-site conditions and is not liable for failing to disclose
off-site defects.50
3. Rationales used by courts applying the general test to find no duty to
disclose a condition that is off-site
Most of the cases where the courts have used the same rule for
off-site conditions as is used for on-site conditions have actually
resulted in a determination that disclosure of the condition was not
required. In other words, even within the parameters of the general
disclosure rule requiring a seller to disclose all off-site conditions that
are material, latent, and within the seller’s knowledge, the courts

46. Id. at 428.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 426 (citing Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965)). For
criticism of the Strawn decision, see Robert Kwong, Fraud and the Duty To Disclose Off-Site
Land Conditions: Actual Knowledge vs. Seller Status, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 897, 918–
23 (1997) (arguing that Strawn’s limitation to professional sellers was inconsistent with New
Jersey’s case law, which applied the disclosure duty to all sellers).
49. See New Jersey New Residential Construction Off-Site Conditions Disclosure Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3C-1 to -12 (West 2004).
50. A “seller’s responsibility to disclose those conditions that may materially affect the
value of the residential real estate, but which are not part of the project, shall be fully met when
notice is provided in accordance with the provision of [the act].” Id. § 46:3C-10(b) See infra
notes 117–36 and accompanying text.
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usually find that these criteria are not satisfied when the condition is
off-site.
a. Information available to buyer or defect is readily observable.
Courts have frequently found that off-site conditions need not have
been disclosed because information about such defects was equally
available to both the buyer and the seller. For example, a Michigan
court held that a seller of commercial land was not liable for failure
to disclose state plans to construct a highway bypass which would
divert traffic, and thus customers, away from the property.51 The
court did not base its holding on the fact that the defect was off-site,
but instead exonerated the seller because the construction plan was a
patent condition which a reasonable investigation by the buyer
would have revealed.52
In a Massachusetts case, DiNunzio v. Jenkins, the sellers did not
have to disclose the existence of a highway approximately 300–500
feet off the property because it was a “readily observable, known
physical condition” excluded from the seller’s disclosure duty.53 The
court found that the highway was easily visible to the buyers during
their many visits to the property,54 as was the noise level and its
resulting effect on the property’s value.55 Again, the court analyzed
this off-site condition in the same manner as on-site defects without
explicitly distinguishing between the two and focused on the
51. McMullen v. Joldersma, 435 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
52. Id. at 431. The court noted that the information was in the public records and that
the buyers admitted taking note of a “rickety old bridge” presently there. Id. The court also
held that a seller cannot be found liable for future possibilities; at the time of the sale, the
bypass project was still contingent upon federal approval and funding, and therefore the sellers’
failure to disclose it did not constitute a fraudulent omission. Id. at 431–32.
53. No. 97-0706B, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 300, at *5 (July 21, 1999). In this case,
the buyers sued the sellers’ real estate agent for violation of a state disclosure law that imposes
liability when “any person” fails to disclose to a buyer any fact, the disclosure of which may
have influenced the buyer not to enter into the transaction. Id. The court affirmed summary
judgment for the agent because he did disclose the proximity of the highway in the disclosure
form by describing the property as “near” the highway. Id. at *8. Even assuming that there
was inadequate disclosure, the agent “did not have a duty to disclose because the proximity of
I-495 to the property was a readily observable, known physical condition.” Id. at *5. It seems
that in interpreting this statute, the court applied a test similar to the general disclosure duty
test.
54. The buyers visited the property seven times over a four-month period. Id. at *2. The
court also noted that cars passing on the nearby highway could be seen from the street in front
of the property. Id. at *2.
55. Id. at *8.
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obviousness of the condition as opposed to its location off the
property.
The court in Saslow v. Novick reached a similar conclusion,
holding that a seller was not liable for failing to disclose an off-site
defect that could have been discovered by the buyer.56 In that case,
the city transit authority attempted to eliminate an adjacent subway
station that provided substantial value to the business located on the
purchased property.57 Even though the seller-defendants knew of the
city’s plans, such information was a matter of public record and up to
the diligent buyer to discover since the location of the subway was an
essential issue to the transaction.58
Neighborhood parking problems have similarly been found to
constitute obvious defects. In Matthews v. Kincaid, the court found
that the seller was under no duty to disclose the absence of off-site
parking since it was an obvious, readily observable defect which the
buyer was expected to discover through “ordinary inspection and
inquiry” before purchasing the property.59
b. Defect is not material. Sometimes courts have found that an
off-site condition was simply not sufficiently material to give rise to a
duty to disclose. In Sleasman v. Sherwood, the buyer discovered after
his purchase that loud noises were coming from a nearby rockcrushing operation.60 Finding for the defendants, the trial court,
sitting without a jury, concluded that the noise level at the subject
property prior to and at the time of the sale “was not loud or
unusual and was not a material fact that should have been disclosed
to the plaintiff.”61 The appellate court affirmed this holding.62
56. 191 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648–49 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
57. Id. at 648. It was undisputed that the defendants knew of the attempt to remove the
subway station, and that if the station was moved, the store would lose most of its value. Id. at
647.
58. Id. at 649.
59. 746 P.2d 470, 472 (Alaska 1987).
60. 622 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App. Div. 1995). The buyer sought rescission of the
transaction and alleged four causes of action: “(1) fraudulent misrepresentation that the
property was fit for use as a summer recreational facility, (2) intentionally failing to disclose the
existence of industrial noise . . . , (3) mutual mistake of fact due to the parties’ ignorance that
the noise existed, and (4) negligent misrepresentation that the property was suitable for
summer rentals.” Id. (numbering added).
61. Id. Apparently, the seller also had no knowledge at all about the defect. Id. This
would have been an independent ground for precluding a duty to disclose. See infra Part
II.A.3.c.

966

ROBERTS.MRO.DOC

957]

10/25/2006 3:11:11 PM

Off-Site Conditions and Disclosure Duties

The court in Strawn v. Canuso also discussed the issue of
materiality.63 The court stated that the issue of materiality typically
would be a question for a jury,64 but held that some conditions—
namely “transient social conditions” in the community—are not
material to a transaction as a matter of law, and in the absence of a
specific inquiry, a seller has no duty to disclose them.65 Such
conditions include, but are not limited to, “the changing nature of a
neighborhood, the presence of a group home, or the existence of a
school in decline.”66 The court did not elaborate on its standard for
“transient social conditions,” perhaps leaving such determinations
for courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. This standard is quite
broad and elastic, as demonstrated by the subsequent cases
attempting to apply it. For example, in Levine v. Kramer Group, the
buyer argued that the defendant-professional sellers67 were liable for
failing to disclose the complaints of a neighbor who was adjacent to
the property upon which the buyer was building its home.68 The
court agreed with the defendants that under Strawn, the neighbor’s
complaints were not an off-site condition requiring disclosure
because the complaints were unrelated to the subject property and
the neighbor merely lived on a neighboring lot and expressed
concerns about the new home being built.69 As such, the complaints
fell under the category of transient social conditions, which there is
no obligation to disclose.70
62. Id. at 362.
63. 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
64. See id. at 431.
65. Id. The court noted that Florida courts held a representation is “material” when the
transaction would not have been entered into had the representation been made. Id. at n.4
(citing Morris v. Ingraffia, 18 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1944)). The court also cited the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 538(2), which deems a matter “material” when “a reasonable man
would attach importance to its existence” or “the maker of the representation knows or has
reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in
determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.” Id.
66. Strawn, 657 A.2d at 431.
67. The Strawn decision applied only to professional sellers and brokers.
68. 807 A.2d 264, 265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). The neighbor exhibited
harassing behavior due to his unhappiness with the height of the buyer’s foundation, including
writing disparaging letters to the mayor, the defendants, and the buyer. Id. at 265–66.
69. Id. at 269.
70. Id. The court also found that the condition was unknown to the seller, and
therefore, even if it was material, there would be no duty to disclose it. Id.; see infra Part
II.A.3.c. The New Jersey legislature later limited the court’s holding in Strawn by enacting the
New Jersey New Residential Construction Off-Site Conditions Disclosure Act. N.J. STAT.
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c. Seller lacks sufficient knowledge. A court might find that a seller
was unaware of an off-site condition and thus cannot be found liable
for failure to disclose it to a buyer. Although not specifically applying
the general disclosure test, the court in Urman v. South Boston
Savings Bank utilized this rationale when a seller failed to disclose
that nearby property was polluted with toxic waste that potentially
contaminated the groundwater near the purchased property.71 The
buyer asserted a cause of action based upon a general consumer
protection law72 pursuant to which the attorney general had adopted
a regulation requiring disclosure much like the common law general
disclosure rule. The regulation provides that a violation occurs if
“any person . . . fails to disclose to a buyer . . . any fact, the
disclosure of which may have influenced the buyer . . . not to enter
into the transaction.”73 The court found the seller had no obligation
to disclose due to the seller’s “limited state of knowledge.”74 The
evidence established only that the seller-bank had been made aware
of an undefined contamination problem that had affected a

ANN. §§ 46:3C-1 to -12 (West 2004). See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text; infra
notes 117–133 and accompanying text.
71. 674 N.E.2d 1078, 1080–81 (Mass. 1997). In August 1989, the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection had declared the area near the property a “priority”
because of evidence that toxic materials were entering the nearby school from contaminated
groundwater flowing under the school. Id. at 1080. The school was then closed for seven
months for the purpose of cleanup. Id. Further investigation revealed that the subject property
was located between the contamination source and the contaminated school. Id. The property
itself was sold in December 1990. Id.
72. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (West 2005). On a related cause of
action based on fraud, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s
summary judgment for the seller because in Massachusetts, “[s]ilence does not constitute a
basis for claiming fraud and misrepresentation, even where a seller may have knowledge of
some weaknesses in the subject of the sale and fails to disclose it.” Urman, 674 N.E.2d at
1081 (citation omitted). The buyer alleged that “[t]he previous owner had told the bank that
he had difficulty selling the [property] because of a hazardous . . . waste problem at [a nearby]
school.” Id. at 1080. Nevertheless, the bank did not inform the buyer that there had been a
contamination problem in the vicinity, that the school had been closed, or that the previous
owner found it difficult to sell the unit. Id. at 1080–81.
73. 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.16(2) (1994). The court acknowledged that in
appropriate circumstances, where the seller is aware of material off-site physical conditions that
are neither known to the buyer nor readily observable, there could be a duty to disclose
pursuant to the consumer protection law. Urman, 674 N.E.2d at 1082. However, this case
did not represent such appropriate circumstances. Id.
74. Urman, 674 N.E.2d at 1082.
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neighborhood school.75 However, the problem had been remedied,
and the school reopened prior to the plaintiff’s purchase of the
property from the bank.76 As far as the bank knew, the
contamination was not an ongoing problem; therefore, the bank had
no duty to disclose it.77
In Sleasman v. Sherwood, where the court held that noise from a
nearby rock-crushing operation was not a material fact warranting
disclosure by the sellers to plaintiff-buyers, the court noted, among
other factors, the sellers’ claim that they were unaware of the
condition.78 Similarly, in Levine v. Kramer Group, the court held that
the sellers were under no duty to disclose harassing behavior by a
neighbor,79 not only because the defect was immaterial as a transient
social condition, but also because the sellers were not aware of any
potential harm from the neighbor.80
B. Judicial Approaches Specifically Applicable to Off-Site Conditions
Some courts use tests for the duty to disclose defects that have
the effect of treating off-site conditions differently than on-site
conditions. Several approaches are worth noting.
1. The off-site defect must affect the physical condition of the property
Urman v. South Boston Savings Bank demonstrates that unless an
off-site condition actually affects the subject property itself, it need
not be disclosed.81 The buyers of a foreclosed condominium unit
alleged that the seller failed to disclose to them a toxic waste
contamination problem on a nearby property.82 The trial court held
that, as a matter of law, the condition need not be disclosed because
it was off-site.83 While the appeals court affirmed the summary
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court also rejected a third cause of action for a negligent infliction of
emotional distress because the bank owed no duty to the buyer. Id. at 1083.
78. 622 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App. Div. 1995); see supra notes 70–73 and accompanying
text.
79. 807 A.2d 264, 265–66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); see supra notes 68–70 and
accompanying text.
80. Id. at 269.
81. 674 N.E.2d at 1082.
82. Id. at 1080. For a full discussion of the facts, see supra text accompanying note 72.
83. Urman, 674 N.E.2d at 1081–82.
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judgment, it held that “the case [did] not turn exclusively on the fact
that the alleged problem was off-site, although that [was] a factor to
be considered.”84 Nevertheless, the appellate court agreed that
disclosure was not warranted in this case.85 Not only did the seller
lack sufficient knowledge, the court emphasized that the off-site
defect never physically affected the property itself.86 Thus, this
analysis suggests that a purely off-site environmental condition that
does not physically affect the property would not need to be
disclosed.
2. The off-site condition exists on adjacent property owned by the seller
An Iowa court imposed a duty on sellers to disclose an off-site
condition when that condition exists on property owned by the seller
that is adjacent to the property the buyer is purchasing. In Timm v.
Clement, the seller sold part of his commercial property to buyers
but did not disclose the existence of two underground storage
tanks.87 The court found the seller liable for failing to disclose these
tanks even if they were off-site.88 However, the court made it clear
that it only imposed a duty on a seller to disclose off-site latent
defects located on other property owned by the seller.89 The court
specifically declined to extend its holding requiring disclosure to
visible off-site conditions located on property owned by a party
outside the contract.90 Thus, the court distinguished between the duty
to disclose off-site conditions on property owned by the seller and
84. Id. at 1082.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73; see also 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.16(2)
(1994).
86. Urman, 674 N.E.2d at 1082. The court stated that “[i]n view of . . . the fact that
the condition had not affected the condominium, and the absence of any demonstrable future
danger to the condominium, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the bank is not liable . . . .”
Id.
87. 574 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). There was a dispute as to whether the
tanks were actually located on defendant’s or plaintiff’s property, but that fact was immaterial
to the holding. Id. There was also evidence that the seller made affirmative misrepresentations.
Id. at 372. At closing, it “signed a groundwater hazard statement stating that there were no
underground storage tanks or hazardous waste on the [sold] property.” Id at 370.
88. Id. at 371–72.
89. Id. at 372. The court stated that “we do not go as far to impose a duty when the
off-site conditions are visible and owned by a party outside the contract . . . .” Id. at 371–72.
Moreover, the duty only exists when the off-site defect may materially affect the market value
or desirability of the property to be sold. Id. at 372.
90. Id.
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off-site conditions on property owned by a third party such as a
neighbor.
3. Seller’s knowledge that existence of off-site condition is important to
buyer
One New Jersey court limited a seller’s liability for failing to
disclose an off-site condition to situations where the seller is aware
that the existence or nonexistence of an off-site condition is
important to a particular buyer. As described above, previously in
New Jersey the disclosure duty was the same for on-site and off-site
conditions.91 However, in the more recent case of Capano v. Borough
of Stone Harbor, a federal court applying New Jersey law held that a
seller was not liable for failing to disclose that there was no
swimming access at a nearby beach.92 The court emphasized that the
condition complained of was “external to both the property and the
contract to purchase.”93 The court distinguished this case from Tobin
noting that in the absence of direct communication by the buyer of a
desire for a swimming beach, the seller “could not have known”
whether “non-existence of [an off-site] swimming beach would
render the property undesirable to the plaintiff.”94
4. The location of the defect as a factor to be considered
A Missouri court has taken an approach that gives weight to the
fact that the condition is off-site, resulting in the court being less
likely to find a disclosure duty for an off-site as opposed to an on-site
95
condition. In Blain v. J.E. Jones Construction Co., buyers sued
developers for failure to disclose their intent to build an apartment
complex nearby.96 Even if the developers intended to build the
nearby complex when they sold the homes to plaintiffs, and thus had
knowledge superior to that of the buyers, the court agreed with the
developers that they had no duty to disclose their intention to

91. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41.
92. 530 F. Supp 1254, 1263 (D.N.J. 1982). The suit involved many complex issues,
including estoppel, the Equal Protection Clause, and the public trust doctrine. Id. at 1257–58.
93. Id. at 1263.
94. Id. This case was also distinguished from Tobin since Tobin involved a misrepresentation while no such claim was brought here. Id.
95. Blain v. J.E. Jones Constr. Co., 841 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
96. Id. at 704.
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build.97 The court considered a number of factors to determine
whether a seller has a duty to disclose.98 The fact that the defect was
off-site played a significant role in the decision. The court stated that
“[i]n sales contracts, if the vendor conceals an intrinsic [on-site]
defect not discoverable by reasonable care, there is a greater
likelihood that a duty to disclose will be found than if the fact is
something extrinsic [off-site] to the property likely to affect market
value.”99 Moreover, the court stated that while a developer’s intent
to build a nearby apartment complex could have an effect on a
buyer’s decision to buy a house, “the significance of this fact is
lessened by its extrinsic [off-site] nature.”100
III. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO DISCLOSURE OF OFF-SITE
CONDITIONS
Legislatures in numerous states have imposed statutory duties
requiring sellers to disclose the existence of defects when they sell
their property. Various rules have been promulgated that are
applicable to off-site conditions.
A. Statutes Requiring Disclosure of Certain Off-Site Conditions
Some states’ disclosure statutes contain broad catch-all provisions
that could be interpreted as including off-site conditions. As an
example, Iowa requires a seller to “[d]isclose all known conditions
materially affecting this property.”101 Nebraska,102 Florida,103
97. Id. at 707–08.
98. Id. at 707. The court gave a non-exclusive list of factors considered in the
jurisdiction, including “the relative intelligence of the parties to the transaction, the relation
the parties bear to each other, the nature of the fact not disclosed, the nature of the contract,
whether the concealer is a buyer or seller, the importance of the fact not disclosed,” and the
parties’ “respective knowledge and means of acquiring knowledge.” Id.
99. Id. at 708.
100. Id. Additionally, the court held that there was no intelligence gap between the
parties, no evidence of fiduciary or confidential relationship, the contract was at arm’s length,
and the existence of multi-family zoning and a proposed layout of the multi-family buildings
were part of the public record. Id. at 708–10. Thus, this information was accessible to the
buyers. Id. at 708.
101. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 193E-14.1(543B) (2005).
102. Nebraska requires disclosure of “any defects that materially affect the value of the
real property or improvements.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2, 120(4)(f) (2005).
103. Florida requires real estate brokers to “[d]isclos[e] all known facts that materially
affect the value of residential real property and are not readily observable to the buyer.” FLA.
STAT. § 475.278(2)(a)(4) (2005).
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Virginia,104 Delaware,105 Oregon,106 Washington,107 and Louisiana108
have similar broad provisions. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
prohibits any unconscionable commercial fraud, misrepresentation,
or knowing concealment or omission of any material fact regarding
the sale of any real estate.109
Other statutory schemes require that sellers use disclosure forms
that include broad language about specific types of conditions that
could apply to off-site as well as on-site conditions. For example,
Washington requires disclosure of “any study, survey project, or
notice that would adversely affect the property.”110 Hawaii’s
disclosure form requires disclosure of whether the property is in a
“noise exposure area.”111 Oklahoma requires disclosure of the
existence of “hazardous or regulated material and other conditions
having an environmental impact.”112 Texas requires disclosure of
“any lawsuits directly or indirectly affecting the [p]roperty.”113
A different approach is taken by states whose statutory disclosure
forms specifically include certain off-site conditions in a list of
conditions that must be disclosed. For example, in California the
legislature enacted a statutory disclosure law requiring a seller and
104. Virginia requires disclosure of “other material defects known to the owner.” VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-519(A)(2)(viii) (2005).
105. Delaware provides that “a seller transferring residential real property shall disclose
. . . all material defects of that property . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2572(a) (2005).
106. Oregon’s disclosure form asks, “[a]re there any other material defects affecting this
property or its value that a prospective buyer should know about?” OR. REV. STAT. § 105.464
(2005).
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.06.020 (2005).
108. Louisiana’s real property form requires disclosure of “other adverse materials or
conditions.” Louisiana Residential Property Disclosure (2006), http://www.lrec.state.la.us/
forms/Residential Property Disclosure 2006 Legal.pdf.
109. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2005). The purpose of this statute has been
interpreted as protecting the public from “sharp practices” in real estate that could victimize
the buyer by inducing him or her to purchase through deceptive or fraudulent practices.
Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 390 A.2d 566, 569 (N.J. 1978).
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.06.020.
111. HAW. REV. STAT. § 508D-15 (2005). The statute requires disclosure that the
residential real property lies in a “noise exposure area” according to maps prepared by the
department of transportation or within an Air Installation Compatibility Use Zone, officially
designated by the military and found adjacent to military airports. Id. Therefore, information
about neighboring properties is relevant.
112. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 833(B)(1)(g) (2005). Presumably, these conditions could be
off-site.
113. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(b) (Vernon 2005). Such lawsuits could potentially
involve other properties in the area.
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any involved broker of a new or used residence to provide the buyer
with a disclosure statement.114 This disclosure form enumerates
mostly on-site conditions but also requires disclosure of
“[n]eighborhood noise problems or other nuisances.”115 Tennessee’s
disclosure form includes the duty to disclose “known neighborhood
noise . . . or other nuisances” and whether there are “[a]ny
authorized changes in road, drainage, or utilities [either] affecting . .
. or contiguous to the property.”116 Michigan’s disclosure form
requires disclosure of a “farm or farm operation in the vicinity; or
[the] proximity to a landfill, airport, or shooting range, etc.”117
Indiana requires the seller to disclose that “an airport is located
within a [certain] geographic distance from the property.”118
Delaware requires the seller to notify the buyer whether the “cost of
repairing and repaving the streets adjacent to the property” is to be
paid by the property owner, noting that “[r]epairing and repaving of
the streets can be very costly.”119 Wisconsin’s disclosure form
requires disclosure by a seller who is “aware of a defect caused by
unsafe concentration of, unsafe conditions relating to, or the storage
of, hazardous or toxic substances on neighboring properties.”120
Georgia requires broker-sellers to disclose all material facts pertaining
to existing adverse physical conditions of the property and “[a]ll
material facts pertaining to existing adverse physical conditions in the
immediate neighborhood within one mile of the property.”121
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (West 2005).
115. Id.; see also Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Ct. App. 1992); supra text
accompanying notes 35–38.
116. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-210 (2005).
117. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.957 (West 2006).
118. IND. CODE § 32-21-5-7 (2005) (The Indiana real estate commission determines the
appropriate geographic distance.).
119. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2578 (2005). This specific requirement is in addition to
the catch-all provision requiring that “a seller transferring residential real property shall disclose
. . . all material defects of that property . . . .” Id. § 2572(a).
120. WIS. STAT. § 709.03 (2005).
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6A-5 (2005). Conditions requiring disclosure are those that
are “actually known to the broker and which could not be discovered by the buyer upon a
diligent inspection of the neighborhood or through the review of reasonably available
governmental regulations, documents, records, maps and statistics.” Id. Enumerated examples
include land-use maps and plans, zoning ordinances, recorded plats and surveys, transportation
maps and plans, maps of flood plains, and tax maps. Id. The statute does not “create any duty
[by] a broker to discover or seek to discover either adverse material facts pertaining to the
physical condition of the property or existing adverse conditions in the immediate
neighborhood.” Id.
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Other jurisdictions delegate creation of the disclosure form to
the state real estate commission.122 Some give the commission wide
discretion as to what conditions require disclosure.123 Such
delegation allows the state’s real estate commission to expand the
disclosure duty by including off-site conditions in the disclosure
form.124
New Jersey takes a different legislative approach. Citing
ambiguity in the disclosure duties of residential real estate sellers, the
New Jersey legislature sought to define the seller’s disclosure duties
and to create a public record of relevant off-site conditions that a
buyer may access.125 The New Residential Construction Off-Site
Conditions Disclosure Act, applicable only to professional sellers126
and builders who sell newly constructed residential units,127 requires
the municipal clerk to make available lists identifying the location of
such off-site conditions within the municipality and any other
municipality within one-half mile of the real estate.128 “Off-site
conditions” are those that “may materially affect the value of
residential real estate property”129 and are limited to nine
enumerated conditions.130 A professional seller need only provide a
122. E.g., IOWA CODE § 558A.4 (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3198 (2005); MD.
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(c)(2) (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 833 (2005);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-50-40 (2005); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2578 (2005).
123. Kentucky requires that the disclosure form must include a list of on-site conditions
and “[o]ther matters the commission deems appropriate.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360(3)
(West 2005). Indiana provides discretion over “[o]ther areas that the Indiana real estate
commission determines are appropriate.” IND. CODE § 32-21-5-7 (2005).
124. Leroy Gatlin II, Note, Reforming Residential Real Estate Transactions: An Analysis
of Oklahoma’s Disclosure Statute, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 735, 754 (1997) (stating that
“pursuant to its authority under the Act, the Oklahoma Real Estate Commission could make
the disclosure form more effective by requiring the disclosure of known neighborhood
nuisances”).
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-2 (West 2005).
126. A professional seller is a real estate broker, salesperson, and broker-salesperson. Id. §
45:15-3.
127. As defined in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-2.
128. See id. §§ 46:3C-4, -8.
129. Id. § 46:3C-3.
130. Id. The conditions are: (1) listings in the Department of Environmental Protection
sites included on the National Priorities List; (2) sites known and confirmed by Department of
Environmental Protection and included on New Jersey’s master list of known hazardous waste
sites; (3) overhead electric utility transmission lines conducting 240,000 volts or more; (4)
electric transformer stations; (5) underground gas transmission lines; (6) sewer pump stations
of a capacity equal to or in excess of 0.5 million gallons per day and sewer trunk lines in excess
of fifteen inches in diameter; (7) sanitary landfill facilities; (8) public wastewater treatment
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written notice to the buyer of the existence of these lists at the time
the contract is executed and is not required to compile or provide its
own list or contribute to the municipality’s list.131 Upon delivery of
the notice to the buyer, the seller is relieved of any further obligation
and is not liable for failing to disclose actually known off-site
conditions. 132 Thus, by statute, the broad common law disclosure
duty for professional sellers set forth in Strawn v. Canuso133 was
significantly limited.
B. Statutes Appearing To Limit Disclosure to On-Site Conditions
Several states limit a seller’s disclosure duties to physical defects
within the boundaries of the property being sold. Such language
seems to preclude the necessity of disclosing off-site conditions. For
example, the Maryland statute calls for the residential property
disclosure statement prepared by the seller to disclose items about
the physical conditions in the property.134 Other states similarly limit
disclosure to defects “on” or “within” the property.135

facilities; and (9) airport safety zones. Id.
131. Id. § 46:3C-8.
132. Id. §§ 46:3C-8, -11. Section 46:3C-10(b) states that “[a] sellers responsibility to
disclose those conditions that may materially affect the value of the residential real estate, but
which are not part of the project, shall be fully met when notice is provided in accordance with
the provisions of [the act].” Id. § 46:3C-10(b); see also Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 772
A.2d 368, 376 (N.J. 2001) (“The legislative history demonstrates that the Disclosure Act was
passed in order to overturn Strawn . . . .”).
133. 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995); see supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
134. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(d) (West 2006). The statute also
enumerates on-site conditions that must be disclosed such as water and sewer systems,
insulation, plumbing, hazardous material, and “any other material defects known to the
vendor.” Id. § 10-702(e).
135. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3196 (2005) (defining “known defects” as
conditions found “within the property”); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(D) (West
2006) (limiting disclosure to “material matters relating to the physical condition of the
property”). Tennessee’s legislation contains language relieving a seller from liability for failing
to disclose any “act or occurrence which had no effect on the physical structure of the real
property, its physical environment or the improvements located thereon.” TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-5-207 (2005). There seems to be contradictory language in another Tennessee statutory
provision which requires disclosure of known neighborhood noise or other nuisances and
whether there are any authorized changes in road, drainage, or utilities affecting the property
or contiguous to the property. Id. § 66-5-210.
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IV. CERTAIN PROBLEMATIC OFF-SITE CONDITIONS

Two types of off-site conditions are worth noting separately:
stigma defects and the presence of a sex offender. Although they
could be analyzed under whatever applicable standard is used in the
jurisdiction, they are problematic because they are somewhat
different than other off-site conditions.
A. Stigma Defects
Certain properties might be considered defective because of nonphysical, psychological conditions or circumstances concerning the
property’s history. These conditions include any condition that is
psychological in nature. Among such conditions are circumstances
involving the property’s history, such as a previous owner dying of
AIDS or cancer, or a murder being committed on the property.
Some courts and legislatures have dealt with the issue of whether a
seller must disclose such stigma defects when they occur in the
property being sold and have specifically excluded this type of on-site
condition from a seller’s duty to disclose. 136
Accordingly, to the extent that a seller would not be required to
disclose stigma defects in the property itself, he would likewise not
be required to disclose such conditions if they occurred off-site. In
fact, Oregon’s legislature explicitly exempts sellers from disclosing
that a neighboring property was “the site of a death by violent crime,
by suicide or by any other manner” or was “the site of a crime,
political activity, religious activity or any other act or occurrence that
does not adversely affect the physical condition of or title to real
property.”137
Conversely, some jurisdictions do not exempt on-site stigma
defects from disclosure. In Ohio, sellers are liable for non-disclosure
of stigma defects if the buyer has made a specific inquiry. Van Camp
v. Bradford, for example, involved stigma defects that were both on-

136. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2156(2) (2006); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
689.25(b) (West 2005) (characterizing a previous murder, suicide, or death on the property as
an immaterial fact that does not warrant disclosure); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.250
(LexisNexis 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-50 (2005) (characterizing a previous occupant’s
status as a sufferer of AIDS as a fact immaterial for purposes of disclosure). Similarly, Louisiana
exempts a seller or an agent from liability for failing to disclose such conditions. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1468.
137. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 93.275 (West 2003).
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site and off-site.138 The complaint alleged that defendant-seller knew
that rapes occurred in the neighborhood and on the premises itself,
yet failed to disclose this fact even after a specific inquiry by the
buyer.139 Even though at the time Ohio still applied the doctrine of
caveat emptor with regard to real estate sales,140 the court created an
exception and held that misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure of a latent material fact by a seller of a residential property,
when a specific inquiry is made, is evidence for a breach of duty by
the seller.141 The court stated that claims for “psychologically tainted
property [are] the natural culmination of the trend regarding
property disclosure in Ohio, and [would] be upheld by th[e]
court.”142 The court also held that the stigma defect at issue was a
latent property defect that was not readily discoverable.143 Such a
defect could become material if a buyer communicates the
importance of the subject to the seller.144 In its holding, the court
did not make any distinctions between on-site and off-site stigma
defects.145
While this case was limited in its application because it only dealt
with non-disclosure where there was a specific inquiry by the
buyer,146 it opens the door to including off-site stigma defects in a
duty to disclose.
B. Presence of a Sex Offender
Little case law exists on whether a common law disclosure duty
extends to the off-site condition of the presence of a sex offender in

138. 63 Ohio Misc. 2d 245, 249–50 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1993).
139. Id. A second cause of action in this case alleged affirmative misrepresentation by the
seller who was asked by the buyer about the purpose and necessity of bars on the windows. Id.
The seller replied that while a break-in occurred sixteen years earlier, the residence was
currently safe. Id.
140. Id. at 252. Ohio enacted a disclosure statute, but it was not in effect at the time of
this sale. Id.
141. Id. at 254.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 253. (“Checking police records in order to ascertain the relative safety of a
neighborhood or a particular residence would not be an action undertaken by even the most
prudent of purchasers.”).
144. See id. at 255. The misrepresentation is material “regardless of its significance to a
reasonable person under similar circumstances.” Id.
145. See id. at 254–55.
146. See id. at 250.
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the neighborhood.147 So far, New York is the only jurisdiction to
address the factual issue, but did so in the context of a limited
disclosure duty. In Glazer v. LoPreste, the court refused to require a
seller to disclose that a registered sex offender lived across the
street.148 This case, however, does not necessarily indicate how this
type of defect would be considered in a jurisdiction that uses the
general disclosure test. At the time Glazer was decided, New York
law did not impose a duty to disclose defects on sellers, except if the
seller or his agent was either in a confidential or fiduciary relationship
with the buyer, or if he actively concealed information.149 The court
refused to require disclosure of the presence of the sex offender
because, on the facts of the case, there was no such relationship or
active concealment, and the information was readily discoverable
because local newspapers had published many articles about the
neighbor’s record as a sex offender.150 Furthermore, the buyer made
no effort to discover information about the neighborhood, and the
seller and broker did not try to prevent the buyer from conducting
his own investigation.151
Some statutory disclosure duties pertain to the duty to disclose
the presence of sex offenders in the neighborhood. While Montana
requires brokers, but not regular sellers, with actual knowledge of
registered sexual or violent offenders relevant to the transaction to
disclose such information,152 other states completely shield both
sellers and brokers from liability because such information is
147. There are no cases dealing directly with whether the presence of a sexual predator in
the neighborhood should be considered a material defect. See Flavio L. Komuves, Comment,
For Sale: Two-Bedroom Home with Spacious Kitchen, Walk-In Closet, and Pervert Next Door, 27
SETON HALL L. REV. 668, 698 (1997); Lori A. Polonchak, Comment, Surprise! You Just
Moved Next to a Sexual Predator: The Duty of Residential Sellers and Real Estate Brokers To
Disclose the Presence of Sexual Predators to Prospective Purchasers, 102 DICK. L. REV. 169, 194
(1997).
148. 717 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (App. Div. 2000). In March, 2002, a statutory disclosure
duty became effective in New York. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 461 (McKinney 2002). It
requires a seller to complete and sign a property condition disclosure statement to be delivered
to a buyer or buyer’s agent prior to the signing by the buyer of a binding contract of sale. Id. §
462. The disclosure form enumerates only on-site conditions. See id.
149. Glazer, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
150. Id. at 258.
151. Id. But see Komuves, supra note 147, at 700 (“Real estate experts seem to indicate
that the presence of a sex offender in a neighborhood, just as any other off-site defect, will
decrease the fair market value of a home. Accordingly, courts will probably recognize the
presence of a sex offender as a material fact.”) (footnotes omitted).
152. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-105 (2005).
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immaterial to the transaction. For example, North Carolina deems
the presence of a sex offender an immaterial condition and does not
require disclosure, even though “no seller may knowingly make a
false statement regarding any such fact.”153 Similarly, South Carolina
provides that “[a]n owner is not required to disclose the fact or
suspicion that a property may be or is psychologically affected,”
including “public information from the sex offender registry.”154
Likewise, Arizona’s disclosure statute exempts sellers from disclosing
the proximity of a sex offender.155
Other jurisdictions require only that the seller disclose to the
buyer where to get information about registered sex offenders,
thereby turning such information into a patent condition a buyer is
expected to discover. For example, California requires disclosure of
the existence of the state sex offender registry,156 but shields both
sellers and brokers from a duty to provide any additional

153. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 39-50 (West 2005).
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-50-90(a) (2005).
155. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2156 (2006). Some commentators have argued
that shield statutes that protect sellers from disclosing the close proximity of a sex offender
have created an apparent conflict with the goal of protecting the public by making available
lists of neighborhood sex offenders as evidenced by Megan’s law. See generally Shelley Ross
Saxer, “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?”: Requiring Landowner Disclosure of the Presence of Sex
Offenders and Other Criminal Activity, 80 NEB. L. REV. 522, 560–61 (2001); Tracey A. Van
Wickler, Legislative Review, H.B. 2564: The Real Estate Disclosure Act Threatens Arizona’s
Children with Becoming “Megan” Victims, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 367 (2000). As an example of this
conflict, North Carolina shields sellers from liability for failing to disclose that a sex offender
resides in or near the property, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 39-50, while the legislature provides
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 that sex offenders pose significant threats to the community,
which justifies release of personal information about such offenders to law enforcement
agencies.
156. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.10a(a) (West 2006). Most states have enacted some type of
registration requirement for released sex offenders. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-22 (2005) (“The
responsible agency shall require the adult criminal sex offender to declare, in writing . . . the
actual address at which he or she will reside or live upon release . . . .”); see GA. CODE ANN. §
42-9-44.1 (2005) (requiring the sex offender to give notice of his or her name, address, crime
convicted of, and date of parole to the superintendent of the public school district where he or
she will reside and to the county sheriff); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821; ARK.
CODE ANN. § 12-12-901 (West 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 2006); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (2005); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 944.606 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8301 to -8328 (2005); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22-4902 to -4912 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.510 (West 2005); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540–:544 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.721–.732 (West 2006);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-21 to -57 (West
2005).
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information.157 Michigan,158 Connecticut,159 Alaska,160 Minnesota,161
and Washington162 similarly require disclosure of only the existence
of public information regarding sex offenders.
V. OFF-SITE CONDITIONS SHOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM
DISCLOSURE
As noted above, courts and legislatures use varied rules to
determine which off-site conditions a seller must disclose to a buyer.
163
This Article suggests a very simple approach: the seller should not
be responsible for disclosing any off-site conditions to the buyer. The
disclosure duties imposed on sellers in recent years should apply only
to conditions on the real property being sold, and should not be
extended to conditions existing beyond the property lines. The

157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.10a(b). The California statute provides that the following
language must be included in every lease agreement and contract for sale of residential real
property: “Notice: The California Department of Justice, sheriff’s departments, police
departments . . . maintain for public access a database of the locations of [registered sex
offenders]. The database is updated on a quarterly basis and is a source of information about
the presence of these individuals in any neighborhood.” Id. § 2079.10a(a)(1).
158. Michigan’s disclosure form provides, “[b]uyers are advised that certain information
compiled pursuant to the Sex Offenders Registration Act . . . is available to the public. Buyers
seeking that information should contact the appropriate local law enforcement agency or
sheriff’s department directly.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.957 (typeface altered from
original).
159. Connecticut limits its disclosure requirement by requiring only that the disclosure
form include “[a] statement that information concerning the residence address of a person
convicted of a crime may be available from law enforcement agencies or the Department of
Public Safety and that the Department of Public Safety maintains a site on the Internet listing
information about the residence address of persons required to register [as sex offenders], who
have so registered.” CONN. GEN STAT. § 20-327b(d)(2)(G) (2004).
160. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.050(1)–(2) (2006).
161. Minnesota requires a broker to disclose that information on registered sex offenders
may be maintained and by whom and if the broker has actual knowledge of sexual or violent
offender registration information that pertains to the subject property. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
82.22.
162. Washington’s disclosure form includes a notice to the buyer that law enforcement
has information on registered sex offenders. The notice is “not an indication of the presence of
registered sex offenders.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.06.020 (West 2005) (typeface altered
from original).
163. The policies and the proposed rule discussed in this section of the Article are meant
to apply specifically to non-professional sellers of real property. Although cases and statutes
discussing professional sellers and brokers were set forth in previous sections to illustrate
approaches taken by courts and legislatures, this Article does not consider whether additional
duties of disclosure should be placed on brokers or professional sellers.
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advantages of this proposed rule lie in its certainty, ease of administration, and fairness.
This proposed rule that the seller should not be required to
disclose off-site conditions will be referred to as the “property line
rule.” For purposes of analysis, it will be compared to the “general
test” discussed earlier, namely, that a seller must disclose defects that
are latent, known to the seller, and materially affect the value of the
property, even if the defect is off-site.164
A. Policy Considerations Favoring the Property Line Rule
1. Certainty
A benefit of the property line rule is that it is a “certain” or
“bright-line” rule. It provides a clear and unambiguous result with
respect to off-site conditions. If the alleged defect is an on-site
condition, it will have to be disclosed if the requirements for
disclosure under the general test are met. However, if the alleged
defect is not within the property line, it need not be disclosed. Rules
that are certain are advantageous to the parties and the legal system
for several reasons.
a. Predictability. (1) Advantages. One major benefit of rules that
are certain is that their clarity results in predictability. People will
know in advance what the law expects of them and can model their
behavior in accordance with the rule. The courts’ affinity for rules
that are certain can be seen in cases involving many different areas of
the law. For example, in Benvenuto v. Mahajan, the court adopted a
bright-line rule on an issue involving attorney’s fees, stating that one
of the benefits of such a rule is that it gave “clear guidance” to the
parties.165 Similarly, in General Electric Co. v. Lowe’s Home Centers,
Inc., the court opted for a strict application of the “economic loss”
rule for lost profits because the strict rule provides the advantages of
“certainty of a bright-line rule” and “predictability to courts and
parties alike.”166 Thus, “[o]bjective standards and bright-line rules .
164. See supra Part II.A.
165. 715 A.2d 743, 745 (Conn. 1998).
166. 608 S.E.2d 636, 639 (Ga. 2005). The plaintiff sought to recover tort damages after
hazardous material was discovered on property it contracted to acquire in order to expand its
existing store. Id. at 637. The “economic loss rule” generally provides that a contracting party
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. . are the very keys to predictability” because “everyone knows or
can discover the rules in advance of their application.”167 Various
other courts have opted for bright-line rules in a diverse range of
matters including attorney negligence in drafting a will,168 worker
compensation benefits,169 right to counsel,170 choice of law,171 and
U.C.C. Article 9.172
(2) Application to disclosure duty. The property line rule
advocated by this Article would bring the advantage of predictability
of bright-line rules to this area of the law that is presently very

can recover in tort only those economic losses resulting from damages to property it already
owns. Id.
167. Lai v. Sagle, 818 A.2d 237, 248 (Md. 2003) (quoting DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins
Hosp., 677 A.2d 73, 76 (Md. 1996)). The court in this case had to decide whether the
plaintiff’s lawyer’s statement to the jury that the defendant had been previously sued warranted
a mistrial. Id. at 239. Because such evidence was inadmissible, the court opted for a bright-line
rule that a mistrial was necessary. Id. at 248–49. The court noted that “[t]he advantage of a
bright line rule lies in its certainty and uniformity in application.” Id. at 248.
168. In Beauchamp v. Kemmeter, the court refused to expand a general rule providing
that attorneys are not liable to third parties for negligent acts committed within the scope of an
attorney-client relationship unless the attorney “acts negligently in drafting or supervising the
execution of a will resulting in a loss to a beneficiary named therein.” 625 N.W.2d 297, 299
(Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Auric v. Cont’l Gas Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1983)).
The court emphasized that this bright-line rule “facilitates predictability in estate planning.”
Id. at 301.
169. In Ametek, Inc. v. O’Connor, the court imposed a bright-line rule that any credit for
payment that an employer made prior to an increase in a workers’ compensation award should
be calculated on a weekly basis. 771 A.2d 1072, 1081 (Md. 2001). The court emphasized the
advantage of predictability in that area of law. See id.
170. The issue in McCambridge v. State was when the “critical stage” in the criminal
process begins and the right to counsel attaches. 778 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
The court established a bright-line rule that a critical stage in criminal proceedings does not
occur until formal charges are brought against a suspect. Id. at 75–76. In support of its brightline rule, the court noted that “the creation of [this] bright line rule results in predictability.”
Id. at 76.
171. E.g., McMillan v. McMillan, 253 S.E.2d 662 (Va. 1979). The Virginia Supreme
Court maintained its bright-line rule that in tort cases, where there is a conflict of law, the law
of the situs of the tort governs. Id. at 664. The court chose not to abandon the benefits of
uniformity, predictability, and ease of application of the Virginia rule “in exchange for a
concept which is so susceptible to inconstancy . . . .” Id.
172. McFarland v. Brier, 850 A.2d 965 (R.I. 2004). The main issue in this case was
whether a certificate of deposit constituted an “instrument” under Article 9 of the U.C.C.,
notwithstanding the fact that it bore a “nontransferable” legend. Id. at 975–76. The court
applied a bright-line rule in holding that certificates of deposit constitute “instruments” for
Article 9 purposes: “Predictability, clarity, and certainty are the key benchmarks in this area of
the law . . . .” Id. at 977 n.7.
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uncertain. With the property line rule, a seller would know that he
need not worry about disclosing defects beyond the property line. A
buyer would know that he could not rely on the seller to tell him
about anything outside of the property boundaries. The parties could
structure their transaction in light of this rule.
The general test has the opposite effect. A seller does not know
what off-site conditions he needs to disclose, which exposes the seller
to a great deal of uncertainty. For example, assume that the
neighborhood children often play basketball in a neighbor’s yard.
The thump of the basketball and the noise of the children can clearly
be heard from the seller’s property. The seller would not know
whether this is something he must disclose. To some people the
sound of children playing is a nuisance. To others, it is music to their
ears. Under the general rule, a court might find it to be a material
condition affecting the value of the property. To be on the safe side,
the seller would need to disclose it. However, it might never cross a
seller’s mind that this might be considered a defect. Suppose this
condition exists a block away, but the noise can still be heard. The
seller would face the same dilemma. Under the general test, the
seller must consider all of the conditions existing in the area from
noise problems to parking issues to prospective development, and
make a determination of whether they are close enough and
significant enough to require disclosure. The law provides little
guidance to sellers, while at the same time exposing them to
potential liability.
b. Judicial economy. (1) Advantages. It is an important policy of
the law to discourage litigation.173 Rules that are certain provide clear
outcomes and thereby effectuate a policy of efficient judicial
administration. Parties are less likely to litigate when they know what
the outcome will be. Furthermore, if litigation is brought, the
certainty of the outcome will lead to quicker settlement or resolution
by the court at the pretrial stage. Thus, among the virtues of a
certain rule are less expense, faster resolution of disputes, and judicial
economy.
In many situations, clear rules have been adopted because their
certainty will reduce litigation. For example, in applying a bright-line
rule in interpreting coverage of an insurance policy indemnification
173. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846 (Ct. App. 1976).
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provision, the California Supreme Court explained that “by
increasing certainty and decreasing uncertainty about the duty to
indemnify, [the rule] serves to deter some litigation on the issue and
to conclude what it does not deter expeditiously and soundly.”174
The policy of using bright-line rules to reduce litigation is also
evident in an Illinois case in which the court refused to displace its
rule that prevents children under the age of seven from being found
contributorily negligent in accidents.175 The court retained its strict
age-limit rule in order to enhance predictability and judicial
economy, emphasizing that a bright-line rule “relieves the jury of the
burden of determining what standard of care” to apply in a particular
case.176
In the real property arena, additional examples can be found in
the law of easements, where many courts have chosen to adopt the
rule that the owner of a servient estate cannot substantially alter or
relocate an easement without the consent of the owner of the
dominant estate.177 Among the benefits cited by the court of this rule
is that it closes the door to increased litigation over “reasonableness”
issues.178 Likewise, when establishing a rule for restrictive covenants,
a court adopted a standard of strict interpretation in order “to
reduce litigation by increasing certainty.”179
(2) Application to Disclosure Duty. To illustrate the judicial
economy of the property line rule, assume that after a sale, a buyer
174. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court, 16 P.3d 94, 107
(Cal. 2001).
175. Chu v. Bowers, 656 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). The plaintiff in this case,
a six-year-old girl, was riding her bicycle when the defendant’s car struck her. The defendant
asserted the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. The plaintiff moved to strike this
defense because under the tender-years doctrine in Illinois, a child under seven years of age
cannot be contributorily negligent. Id. at 437–38.
176. Id. at 439. The court so held, despite recognizing that several other jurisdictions
have rejected the doctrine primarily because of the arbitrariness of any age limit. Id.
177. See, e.g., Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1231 (Colo.
2001).
178. See Herren v. Pettengill, 538 S.E.2d 735, 736 (Ga. 2000).
179. Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Or. 1997). The court reasoned that a
maxim of strict construction of restrictive covenants when ambiguity exists prevents imposing a
restriction that a buyer is not reasonably expected to know, allows full use of property, reduces
litigation, and enhances uniform interpretation of similar covenants. Id. Other examples
abound. See, e.g., State v. Hartley, 511 A.2d 80, 88 (N.J. 1986) (noting that a bright-line
interpretation of the requirement for a suspect to be given fresh Miranda warnings before
resumption of custodial interrogation will help avoid “confusion and conflict in future cases”).
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learns that the owners of property several blocks away are planning
to build a discount store. The store will generate traffic, some of
which will pass by the buyer’s property, thereby detracting from the
quiet nature of the neighborhood. Does the disappointed buyer have
a cause of action against his seller for failure to disclose this off-site
condition? Under the property line rule the answer is clearly in the
negative. Nothing needs to be litigated. If the buyer does bring a
lawsuit, any claims for nondisclosure can be summarily rejected at
the pretrial stage of litigation.
In contrast, the general test is quite uncertain and can result in
much litigation. For example, on the facts of the hypothetical set
forth above, the buyer does have a cause of action under the general
test. Whether the buyer’s lawsuit will be successful will depend on
numerous factors that will need to be litigated. Among these are
whether the fact that a store will be built is material,180 whether it
was readily observable,181 whether the information was equally
available to the buyer,182 or whether the seller knew about it.183
Furthermore, these relevant factors of the general test are all
questions of fact that, when present, prevent disposal of the case at
the pretrial stage of litigation, such as by a demurrer, a motion to
dismiss, or a motion for summary judgment.184 These factual
inquiries of the general rule usually compel a full trial, resulting in
increased litigation expense and utilization of judicial resources.
The case of Sleasman v. Sherwood demonstrates the expensive
litigation resulting from the application of the general test to off-site
conditions.185 Even though the defendant-sellers won, they endured
a lengthy trial where they had to call numerous witnesses.186 Only
180. See supra text accompanying notes 60–62.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 53–59.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 71–80.
184. Roberts, supra note 5, at 20. Summary judgment is granted only when no triable
issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437(c) (West 2006). Accordingly, in reversing a
summary judgment in favor of a seller and requiring the case to go to trial, the court in Ribak
v. Centex Real Estate Corp. stated “[i]f the evidence raises any issues of material fact, if it is
conflicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it tends to prove the issues, it
should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by the jury.” 702 So. 2d
1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
185. 622 N.Y.S.2d 360 (App. Div. 1995).
186. Defendants not only had to testify themselves that they never heard any industrial
noise, they also had to call six witnesses, including former renters of the cabins, to testify that
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after an appeal did the sellers determinatively prevail on the issue that
the defect was not material and thus did not need to be disclosed.187
Similarly, in Matthews v. Kincaid, the defendant-seller was
exonerated of liability only after the case reached the Alaska Supreme
Court, which reversed the trial court’s finding and held that lack of
off-site parking was readily observable to the buyer.188
c. Costs of real estate transactions. The unpredictability of the
general test may result in increased costs of real estate sales. The
more risk of litigation imposed on sellers as a result of their sale, the
greater the likelihood that sellers will respond by raising the price of
the property. Under the general test, a seller runs the risk that after
the sale he might be sued for failure to disclose an off-site condition.
He is likely, therefore, to compensate for this risk by increasing the
price. The property line rule, on the other hand, eliminates one of
the risks of litigation faced by a seller after he sells his property and
may result in lower transaction costs.
2. Fairness
Of course, certainty, predictability, and judicial economy should
not be the only determinants in deciding which rule to apply. If
these were the only considerations, all legal rules would be brightline rules involving no discretion by a finder of fact. Often, flexible
rules are called for in order to reach fair results. In deciding whether
to use a certain rule such as the property line rule or a flexible rule
such as the general test, the relevant question becomes whether the
benefits of flexibility warrant the increased uncertainty and
expense.189

they heard no industrial noise prior to the closing. Id. at 361.
187. Id.
188. 746 P.2d 470, 472 (Alaska 1987). The plaintiff had prevailed at the trial court level
and was awarded $98,258.20 in damages. Id. at 471.
189. For example, in deciding an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the United States
Supreme Court valued the need for certainty and simplicity over individualized justice in each
particular case. See Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 465 n.13 (1980). See also
Christina L. Wu, Comment, Noncompete Agreements in California: Should California Courts
Uphold Choice of Law Provisions Specifying Another State’s Law?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 593
(2003), where the author argues for California to adopt a bright-line rule upholding choice of
law provisions in out-of-state non-compete agreements. The author emphasizes that while a
bright-line rule is less “sensitive” to factual distinctions, “it would nevertheless satisfy the
ultimate goal of producing fair and consistent outcomes.” Id. at 596. Also, in McMillan v.
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a. The benefits of a flexible rule do not warrant the cost. There are
few benefits to the flexibility provided by the general test for
disclosure of off-site conditions. Even under the general test,
situations where a court would conclude at the end of litigation that
the seller should have disclosed an off-site condition are very rare. In
fact, no currently viable case has actually found a seller liable for
failure to disclose an off-site condition.190 The general test requires
that the off-site condition materially affect the subject property,
would not be discovered by the buyer, is known to the seller, and is
material.191 It is difficult to imagine a purely off-site condition a seller
would know about that the buyer could not reasonably find that
would materially affect the subject property. For example, cases
applying the general rule have concluded that a nearby industrial
rock-crushing plant,192 the unavailability of off-street parking,193 and
plans to build a highway bypass194 were all reasonably discoverable
and thus did not require disclosure.195 Location of toxic waste sites
and registered sex offenders residing in the community are generally

McMillan, the Virginia Supreme Court chose to retain a bright-line rule for choice of law in
torts cases, stating it did not wish to abandon the benefits of the uniformity, predictability, and
ease of application of the Virginia rule in exchange for a concept “which is so susceptible to
inconstancy.” 253 S.E.2d 662, 664 (Va. 1979).
190. Two cases held that liability should be imposed if the conditions were material. The
court in Shapiro v. Sutherland reversed a summary judgment in favor of the seller and
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of materiality, holding that the seller
would be liable for the failure to disclose neighborhood noise if the noise was material. 76 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 101, 111 (Ct. App. 1998). Similarly, the court in Ribak v. Centex Real Estate Corp.
reversed a summary judgment and remanded the case for a jury determination of the issue of
whether failing to disclose that “a water treatment plant” was also a “wastewater treatment
plant” was material. 702 So. 2d 1316, 1316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). As mentioned above,
there were two cases in New Jersey where professional sellers were found liable for failing to
disclose off-site conditions. See Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995); Tobin v.
Paparone Constr. Co., 349 A.2d 574 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). These cases, however,
are not good law since they were superseded by a statute under which professional sellers are
only required to notify buyers that a list of certain off-site conditions within the municipality
exists. See New Jersey New Residential Construction Off-Site Conditions Disclosure Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-10(b) (West 2004). For more information, see supra notes 39–50 and
accompanying text.
191. See Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (Ct. App. 1963); supra Part II.A.1.
192. Sleasman v. Sherwood, 622 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App. Div. 1995).
193. Matthews, 746 P.2d at 471.
194. McMullen v. Joldersma, 435 N.W.2d 428, 430–31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
195. See supra Part II.A.3.a. But see Ribak, 702 So.2d at 1316. (appearing not to require
inspection by the buyer to discover an adjacent wastewater plant).
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available in public records. Landfills are usually surrounded by fences
with marked signs, and other nearby conditions could be discovered
by simply driving through the neighborhood. These cases illustrate
that defects that are off-site and are significant enough to be material
are usually not latent. Since buyers can discover them with
reasonable diligence, the defects would not need to be disclosed
even under the general test.
Of course, situations requiring disclosure under the general test
could arise under particular fact patterns. For example, a seller might
know of something that is going to happen in the neighborhood
that is not yet a matter of public record, such as the seller learning of
a neighbor’s intention to develop his property in a manner that
would adversely affect the seller’s property before the neighbor has
applied for a building permit or publicly disclosed his plans. Another
example would be unusual conditions that a buyer would not suspect
or be expected to discover, such as a neighbor who repeatedly makes
loud noises in the middle of the night. However, precedent shows
that courts are reluctant to grant relief to a buyer even in these types
of situations. An argument could be made that the neighbor’s plans
to develop his property need not be disclosed because the zoning
laws allowing for such future development are equally discoverable
by the buyer.196 The neighbor who makes noises in the night could
be labeled a “transient social condition” that need not be
disclosed.197
As set forth above, the costs of applying the general test to offsite conditions are high. Because there are so few cases where a
flexible rule such as the general test is needed to protect a buyer, the
costs of applying the general test are not warranted.
b. The property line rule affords protection to sellers. Considerations
of fairness do not only involve the interests of buyers; the situation of
sellers must also be given weight. The general test requires a seller to
disclose any latent, material, off-site condition that is known to the
seller. However, under this test, the seller is uncertain at the time of
196. See McMullen, 435 N.W.2d at 430–31 (finding that plans for the construction of a
highway bypass were discoverable by the buyer).
197. See Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 431 (N.J. 1995). The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that in the absence of a specific inquiry, there is no obligation to disclose a
“transient social condition” such as “the changing nature of a neighborhood, the presence of a
group home, or the existence of a school in decline.” Id.
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sale whether an off-site condition is one that he must disclose. This
uncertainty is compounded because there are no limits in the general
test regarding the proximity of the defect to the property being sold.
The seller may be required to disclose anything a buyer might
discover and later allege is material. What is material to one buyer
may not be material to another. As discussed earlier, even under the
best scenario, sellers will be burdened by lengthy and costly
litigation.198 In contrast, this uncertainty will be eliminated under the
property line rule. This rule will eliminate the risk to the seller of
facing litigation over off-site conditions and will put buyers on notice
that they are responsible for investigating the neighborhood to
satisfy themselves.
3. Off-site conditions are distinguishable from on-site conditions.
This Article is not advocating the abolition of the general test
with regard to the disclosure of on-site conditions, even though a
rule of “no duty to disclose” would of course promote the goals of
predictability and judicial economy. Considerations of fairness that
are the basis of the general test with respect to on-site conditions do
not apply with equal force to off-site conditions. With on-site
conditions, the rationale for requiring disclosure is that a seller who
has lived on the property is thought to have knowledge about the
condition of the property superior to that of a buyer.199 Therefore, it
is reasonable to impose a duty on sellers to disclose latent, material
defects about which they are aware.200 This rationale is substantially
diminished when the conditions are off-site. There should be no
expectation that by simply living in a neighborhood, a seller would
know about off-site conditions such as contamination of a nearby
property201 or an attempt by a city transit authority to eliminate a
subway station.202 Moreover, off-site conditions are not hidden
behind a lock and key and can often be easily discovered by
prospective buyers.
Furthermore, if an off-site condition turns into an on-site
condition, it will be subject to the general test and not the property

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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Roberts, supra note 5, at 12.
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See Urman v. S. Boston Sav. Bank, 674 N.E.2d 1078 (Mass. 1997).
See Saslow v. Novick, 191 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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line rule. This comports with considerations of fairness, because then
the seller would be more likely to have superior knowledge of the
condition. An example of a condition that originates off-site and
then becomes on-site is something that ultimately physically intrudes
upon the subject property, such as a nearby toxic waste spill that
eventually leaks onto the seller’s property.203
B. Judicial and Statutory Approaches Support the Property Line Rule
1. Disclosure cases and statutes
Several judicial and statutory approaches to a seller’s duty to
disclose defects support the property line rule. For example, the
approach of limiting disclosure obligations to off-site defects that
affect the physical condition of the property is tantamount to saying
that the defect must be on-site. This approach was employed in
Urman v. South Boston Savings Bank, where the court did not
impose liability on a seller for failure to disclose a toxic
contamination in a nearby property and emphasized that the off-site
defect never physically affected the property itself.204 Several states
have enacted statutes that impose this limitation. For example, in
Ohio, the residential property disclosure law requires disclosure of
defects limited to “material matters relating to the physical condition
of the property.”205 Tennessee’s legislation relieves a seller from
liability for failing to disclose any “act or occurrence, which had no
effect on the physical structure of the real property, its physical
environment or the improvements located thereon.”206
Another approach supporting the property line rule is the
limitation on disclosure of off-site defects to those that exist on
adjacent property owned by the seller. Not only does this approach
show judicial concern for the location of defects, but it also follows
the rationale that it is a seller’s superior knowledge of the conditions
on the property that triggers a disclosure duty. The Iowa Court of
Appeals used this test in Timm v. Clement, where it stated that
203. See supra Part II.B.2.
204. 674 N.E.2d 1078, 1082 (Mass. 1997); see supra notes 72-77.
205. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(d) (West 2006); see supra note 135.
206. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-207 (2005); see supra note 116; see also MD. CODE
ANN., REAL. PROP. § 10-702(d) (West 2003); MINN. STAT. § 513.55 (2003) (requiring only
disclosure of “all material facts pertaining to adverse physical conditions in the property”).
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disclosure was required because the latent off-site defects were
located on property also owned by the seller.207
2. Non-disclosure cases: Environmental stigma cases
Courts have used a property line rule in analyzing claims
unrelated to disclosure duties. These cases involve claims by
landowners for devaluation of their property due to environmental
contamination that is not on their property but rather on other
property in the neighborhood. In other words, the contamination is
an off-site condition. Many courts have held that these
“environmental stigma” damages are unrecoverable because the
contamination did not physically intrude on the plaintiff’s
property.208 For example, in Adams v. Star Enterprise, a major
discharge of oil occurred at the defendant’s facility with a “plume” of
oil extending underground toward the plaintiffs’ town.209 Although
the plaintiff-homeowners’ properties were not physically affected,
they sued for diminution in property value due to the proximity of
the plume.210 The court affirmed dismissal of the diminution of value
claim because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate actual physical
encroachment on their properties.211
VI. CONCLUSION
The demise of the doctrine of caveat emptor and the imposition
of a duty on sellers to disclose defects in property being sold left
unresolved the issue of whether sellers should be obligated to
disclose off-site conditions as well. Extending a seller’s disclosure
duty to off-site conditions ignores the inherent differences between
on-site and off-site conditions. With off-site conditions, a disclosure
duty is not justified by a seller’s superior knowledge or a buyer’s lack
of opportunity to inspect. Moreover, applying the general disclosure

207. 574 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); see supra text accompanying notes
87–90.
208. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 1031, 1034 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003).
209. 51 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 425; see also Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992)
(holding that landowners must still show that contamination physically intruded on their land
where negative publicity creates fear of potential future contamination).
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duty test to off-site conditions will result in uncertainty, costly waste
of judicial resources, and unfairness to sellers.
Adopting instead the property line rule that requires no
disclosure of off-site conditions will promote fairness and stability in
real estate transactions. Sellers will not have to fear the prospect of
lengthy litigation and potential liability for failure to disclose an offsite condition arising after the sale. Buyers will necessarily pay more
attention themselves to the surrounding neighborhood before
purchase knowing that a judicial remedy is unavailable.
The costs of requiring disclosure of off-site conditions are too
high to warrant the problems associated with such a rule.
Accordingly, in the absence of misrepresentation, courts should
adopt the rule that a seller is not liable for failure to disclose off-site
conditions. A certain and bright-line rule for a seller’s duty to
disclose defects should be drawn at the property line.
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